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Abstract— Quantum Cryptography (QKD) uses the laws 
of Quantum Mechanics to create new cryptographic 
primitives. Precisely, this technique is based on two laws 
of quantum mechanics, namely uncertainty principle and 
no-cloning theorem. The best known QKD is the BB84 
protocol published by Bennett and Brassard in 1984. Since 
then, various QKD protocols have been developed for 
example a B92 protocol. This latter is similar to that of 
BB84but this time using only two non-orthogonal states of 
the four states of BB84. In this work, we develop the java 
simulation B92 protocol and we give some details of the 
implementation. Next, we show by an example how Alice 
(Initiator) can configure the protocol parameters before 
execution. Finally, we give the statistical results allowing 
to compare this protocol with that of BB84. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The basic idea of the security of quantum transmissions 
was the instability of the quantum elements during the 
measurement. The B92 protocol is a simpler version of 
BB84 [1,2]. It is a two-state protocol (it uses two non-
orthogonal quantum states) invented by Charles Bennett in 
1992. It is based on the fact that two non-orthogonal 
quantum states are sufficient to guarantee the detection of 
an eavesdropper. Since no measurement can distinguish 
two non-orthogonal quantum qubit [3], it is impossible to 
identify the qubit with certainty. In addition, any attempt 
to learn the qubit will alter the qubit in a notable way. The 
coding scheme B92 is sometimes easier to implement. The 
coding scheme B92 uses a one-to-one correspondence 
between the conventional qubits and the quantum states. 
To send the qubit b, Alice prepares a photon in the 
following quantum state: 0° Horizontal polarization codes 
0 and +45° Diagonal polarization for coding 1.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 
presents and introduces our approach. Section 3 gives a 
predict the ear of a spy. Section 4 illustrates and presents 
the comparison of BB84 and B92. Section 5 concludes the 
paper and provides an outlook into future work. 
II. CONCEPTION 
Fig.1 shows the interface of our application that provides 
an implementation explaining a quantum transmission 
simulation based on the B92 protocol. Although it 
provides only a secret key distribution, the architecture can 
exploit to ensure a more secure transmission. Our 
application consists of designing a protocol running on a 
single computer or on two computers (servers) connected 
remotely via a socket connection [6]. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Simulation of the B92 protocol without spy. 
 
These servers can be used either to simulate a quantum 
channel, or to interact the two ends of a real quantum 
channel. The output generated by a protocol execution is a 
collection of HTML [7] files providing feedback for all 
relevant phases of the protocol. The software architecture 
consists of 4 main steps: 
 Alice randomly prepares each photon with ether 0° 
Horizontal polarization assigned a qubit of value 
(|0>) or |+45> Diagonal polarization assigned a 
qubit of value (|1>) [4, 5]. 
 Alice sends the polarized photon to Bob. This one 
is equipped with a polarization analyzer that 
measures randomly along the two basis. that is to 
say according to the following four directions (0°, 
+45°, 90° or -45°) 
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 Bob informs Alice via an authenticated public 
channel the basis used, but not the polarization of 
the photon. 
 Alice and Bob keep the polarizations of the photons 
(qubits) sent and received in directions 45° and 90° 
and reject those received in directions 0° and 45°. 
1.1. Example 
For example, if Bob detects a photon by measuring with a 
polarized filter on the 90° direction, he knows that Alice 
has sent a polarization photon 45° (it cannot be 0° 
polarization) and therefore it encodes this value by the bit 
1. Bob can therefore assign the detections 90° the binary 
values 1, and the detections 45° the value 0. If Bob does 
not detect the photon, he cannot be certain which state 
Alice sent. Thus, Alice and Bob keep only those 
measurements where Bob detected a photon. This 
sequence of 0 and 1 bits values forms the key. 
1.2. Algorithm of B92 
The algorithm of the B92 protocol is: 
 
 
III. PREDICT THE EAR OF A SPY 
1.3. Case: without spy 
Alice and Bob communicate in an authenticated public 
channel to determine which photons have been detected. 
To do this, they exchange a small number of their bit 
values which are then rejected (because they are no longer 
secure) to check for errors. Assuming no spy has 
intervened, Alice and Bob will have the same qubit 
sequences. Unlike the BB84 protocol which extracts a 
sample from the shared key, the B92 protocol even 
exploits the rejected qubits to calculate the probability of 
transmission error. It leaves the key intact. After publicly 
communicating, Alice and Bob find half of these qubits 
rejected common. Which shows the absence of espionage 
listening. This is the ideal case for negligence and errors 
due to the impurity of the transmission channel. Fig 2. 
illustrates the results obtained 
 
Fig. 2: Average number of qubits received correctly in the 
absence of the Spy. 
1.4.  Case: with spy 
Figure3 illustrates the interface of the application in the 
presence of a spy. The analysis of the results obtained 
shows that the increase in the measurement rate of the spy 
disrupts the transmission. Indeed, if the probability of error 
is better than 0:25, then the transmission is no longer 
secure. 
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Fig. 3: Simulation of  B92 protocol with spy. 
 
1.5. Interpretation 
Fig. 4 illustrates the results obtained. It can be seen that the 
average number of qubits measured between Alice and 
Bob decreases compared to the previous case (case without 
spy). Certainly, as long as the error rate is below a 
threshold (Perror < 0:25) [4] the spy remains deaf. 
 
IV. COMPARISON OF BB84 AND B92 
1.6. View on BB84 and B92 
With some simple modifications in BB84, one can adopt it 
in model B92. In this last protocol Alice does not encode 
the qubit randomly. If the generated bit is zero then it 
sends the polarized photon 0° if the bit is equal to one then 
the polarized photon 45° is exchanged. With some 
modifications in the code of BB84, we can adopt it in 
model B92. 
1.7. Attack "Intercept Resend" 
In terms of indiscreet detection, B92 is better than BB84. 
This is well explained in figure5 and figure6. 
1.8.  Analysis and interpretation 
The probability of detection of spy converges faster to 1 
when the number of quits exchanged is large. Thus the 
number of correct measurements between Alice and Bob is 
reduced; this is due to the listening of the spy's indiscreet 
ear. 
 
Fig. 4 :Average number of qubits received in the same 
databases in thepresence of a only spy. 
 
In addition, the simplicity of implementing the B92 
protocol and the Figure 5: BB84 and B92 comparison for 
Intercept Resend correct measurements by eavesdropper. 
Number of de-mined exchange bit makes this protocol 
more efficient compared to its BB84 ancestor. 
 
Fig. 5: BB84 and B92 Comparison for Intercept Resend 
eavesdropper detection. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In this work we have developed a java simulation of 
protocol B92 (BB84 version) for key quantum exchange. 
The analysis of the results obtained allowed us to define a 
security zone where the presence of the spy does not 
influence the transmission. This study also confirmed to 
us, after a statistical comparison, the importance of the 
B92 protocol in relation to its BB84 ancestor and this, 
even if their main steps are similar. 
As future works, we will evaluate our approach on more 
complex systems as quantum teleportation. We will study 
the possibility of developing the java simulation, 
comparing and giving more details of the implementation. 
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